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FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON THE
TECHNOLOGICAL MONITORING OF CONVICTED
SEX OFFENDERS
Ben A. McJunkin* and J.J. Prescott**
More than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their convicted
sex offenders using GPS devices. Many offenders will be monitored for life.
The burdens and expense of living indefinitely under constant technological
monitoring have been well documented, but most commentators have assumed
that these burdens were of no constitutional moment because states have
characterized such surveillance as ‘‘civil’’ in character—and courts have seemed
to agree. In 2015, however, the Supreme Court decided in Grady v. North
Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person was a Fourth
Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the sur-
veillance. Grady left open the question whether the search—and the state’s
technological monitoring program more generally—was constitutionally rea-
sonable. This Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness as it applies to both current and envisioned sex offender moni-
toring technologies to evaluate whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an
effective check on post-release monitoring regimes.
Keywords: Fourth Amendment, sex offenders, monitoring, GPS technology,
search, privacy, post-release regulations
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I N TRODUCT ION
The technological monitoring of sex offenders is not a new phenomenon.1
It has, however, become an increasingly popular one. Laws subjecting
convicted sex offenders to some form of technological monitoring, often
for very long terms or lifetimes, have multiplied in the past decade.2 Rapid
technological advancements now permit relatively low-cost location track-
ing twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week.3 Some legal scholars
have lauded these developments because technological monitoring of sex
offenders appears to impose ‘‘minimal intrusion’’ compared to alternative
forms of social control.4 Yet that claim has rarely been examined in detail.
In fact, courts have largely assumed that the intrusion imposed by tech-
nological monitoring was insufficiently serious to warrant constitutional
scrutiny.5 That is, until the Supreme Court upset this easy assumption.
1. See Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 146–48 (2017)
(documenting the development and expansion of sex offender monitoring dating back
many years). Throughout this Essay, we use the term ‘‘technological monitoring’’ (and
variants of this term) to refer not only to the variety of location-based tracking authorized by
current sex offender laws—including satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) de-
vices and radio frequency (RF) transmitters—but also more broadly to any deployment of
current or future technology in a manner that permits individualized tracking and
observation.
2. See discussion infra Part I.
3. Further, under many state statutes, the costs of maintaining technological monitoring
are passed on to the offender subject to monitoring. See, e.g., Rhonda Cook, Sex Offender
Argues Mandatory Ankle Monitors Are Unconstitutional, THE ATL. J.-CONST. (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.myajc.com/news/local/sex-offender-argues-mandatory-ankle-monitors-are-
unconstitutional/SaXCToWMJ3wgmFm2mvMuzN/.
4. See Pamela Foohey, Applying the Lessons of GPS Monitoring of Batterers to Sex Offenders,
43HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 281, 284 (2008). Although our observations here are focused on
the monitoring of sex offenders, the future of criminal justice is likely to include increased
technological monitoring in lieu of punishment. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric, Dan Hunter, &
Gabrielle Wolf, Technological Incarceration and the End of the Prison Crisis, 108 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 73, 77 (2018) (proposing technological and remote surveillance as a sub-
stitute for physical incarceration). The insights of this Essay therefore may have extended
applicability, both for litigants fighting for less intrusive monitoring laws and for legal actors
and institutions wishing to monitor individuals in a constitutional manner.
5. Constitutional challenges to sex offender monitoring programs—historically mounted
under legal frameworks, such as the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment, that do not treat the intrusiveness of
monitoring as doctrinally salient—have typically been unsuccessful. See Nicholas Corsaro,
380 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 21 | NO . 3 | SUMMER 2018
In March 2015, the Supreme Court held in Grady v. North Carolina that
attaching a device to a person’s body to track their movements, without
consent, is a search subject to judicial review for reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment.6 The Court declined to decide the question whether
North Carolina’s monitoring requirement was reasonable. But it did offer
general guidance to lower courts reviewing monitoring programs: ‘‘The
reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances,
including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the
search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.’’7 Grady thus pro-
vides a new constitutional lens for analyzing sex offender monitoring pro-
grams, one that explicitly invites examination of the intrusion experienced
by the individual through application of the Fourth Amendment’s long-
standing search-and-seizure principles.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the
substance and diversity of current laws authorizing the technological mon-
itoring of convicted sex offenders. It situates these monitoring regimes
within the rapid historical development of laws regulating convicted sex
offenders more generally—such as sex offender registries, reporting and
notification requirements, and inclusion and exclusion zones. It also dis-
cusses the well-documented burdens and disabilities that technological
monitoring imposes on those subject to surveillance. Part II reports the
recent developments in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that have opened the door for new legal challenges to the intrusion of
technological monitoring. It examines both the Grady decision and its
predicate case, United States v. Jones, which unsettled the conventional
understanding of when governmental use of technological monitoring
qualifies as a search. It also explains the framework for resolving the ulti-
mate question of the constitutionality of sex offender monitoring laws—
whether the monitoring, as a search, is ‘‘unreasonable.’’
Note, Sex, Gadgets, and the Constitution—A Look at the Massachusetts Sex Offender GPS-
Tracking Statute, 48 SUFFOLK L. REV. 401, 414–19 (2015).
6. Grady, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015). The law at issue in Grady created a satellite-based
monitoring program that maintained time-correlated and continuous tracking of the geo-
graphic location of the subject and required reporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive
and proscriptive schedule or location requirements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.
40(c) (West 2017).
7. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.
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Part III is the heart of the Essay. It identifies and explores several distinct
dimensions along which the technological monitoring of sex offenders may
be considered especially intrusive. It links the identified dimensions of
intrusion to both existing Fourth Amendment doctrines and contemporary
scholarly theories about the Amendment’s future. In so doing, it highlights
several pressure points, where the implementation of technological moni-
toring regimes for sex offenders may need to be curtailed or tailored to
accommodate longstanding interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
such as privacy, bodily integrity, and human dignity. Part IV picks up
where Part III ends, anticipating and evaluating two theoretical avenues
that governments who seek to legislate around the Fourth Amendment
might explore, concluding that such attempts would be limited in their
efficacy.
Ultimately, this Essay asks a simple, but fundamental question: To what
extent does the Fourth Amendment actually constrain whether and how
monitoring technologies can be used to surveil sex offenders (or even
criminal offenders more broadly)? In answering that question, we seek to
accomplish two goals. First, we aim to inform and educate legal actors who
have a vested interest in ensuring the constitutionality and reasonableness
of sex offender monitoring laws, whether they are legislators designing
monitoring regimes for the benefit of their constituents or litigants seeking
to find a way out from under particularly invasive monitoring require-
ments. Second, we interject ourselves into this discrete moment of consti-
tutional uncertainty to help ensure that open foundational questions of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are resolved thoughtfully and conscien-
tiously, despite arising in a context—the regulation of convicted sex offen-
ders—that can spur strong emotions and lead to hasty conclusions.
I . THE STATE OF SEX OFFENDER MON ITOR ING
Sometime near the start of the twenty-first century, states began to use
technology to monitor formerly incarcerated sex offenders.8 Florida,
8. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 147–48; Eric M. Dante, Comment, Tracking the
Constitution—The Proliferation and Legality of Sex-Offender GPS-Tracking Statutes, 42
SETON HALL L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2012); ASSOCIATED PRESS, States Track Sex Offenders by
GPS, WIRED (July 30, 2005), https://www.wired.com/2005/07/states-track-sex-offenders-
by-gps/.
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California, and Massachusetts led the way.9 By 2006, more than twenty
states monitored sex offenders with technological devices.10 As of 2015, the
number of states had grown to more than forty.11 The statutory basis for
sex offender monitoring varies from state to state. Some states, such as
Wisconsin and North Carolina, make it available upon a convicted sex
offender’s release from civil commitment.12 Other states, such as California
and Alaska, make it a condition of parole or probation.13 At least one state,
Michigan, imposes sex offender monitoring as part of the sentence imposed
at conviction for a number of specified sex offenses.14
Technological monitoring programs for sex offenders differ on other
fronts, too. In pointing this out, we are not about to embark on presenting
a complete picture of monitoring regimes in the United States. We will
instead simply offer a few examples to highlight how much variation there
is along different dimensions. One example is whether monitoring is
discretionary. In some states, the decisions whether and how to impose
monitoring require an individualized assessment from a neutral decision-
maker.15 Depending on the state, this may be either a judge or a parole
board.16 In other states, at least for certain offenses, monitoring is manda-
tory.17 Similar diversity exists with respect to the duration of technological
9. Dante, supra note 8, at 1172.
10. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE CRIME LEGISLATION IN
2006, 1–2 (2007), http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/2006crime.pdf.
11. Dante, supra note 8, at 1172; Richard Wolf, High Court Orders Review of Sex Offender
GPS Monitoring, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/03/30/supreme-court-sex-offender-gps/70544348/.
12. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.30B.
13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100(f) (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (West 2012).
14. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520n(1) (2006).
15. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(14) (2017) (permitting judges to impose
monitoring); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-84 (2014) (permitting judges to impose GPS
monitoring as condition of parole); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.91(c) (West 2007) (permit-
ting judges complete discretion as to imposing monitoring on certain sex offenders); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (McKinney 2010) (permitting court to impose monitoring when it
will ‘‘advance public safety.’’).
16. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b)(1) (2014) (granted parole board authority
to impose monitoring); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.704(5) (2016) (permitting Department
of Corrections to impose monitoring).
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2016); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (2017);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 47; MICH. COMP. LAWS 750.520n(1) (2006); MO. REV. STAT. §
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monitoring. At least seven states, at least for certain crimes, require mon-
itoring for life.18
Technological monitoring numbers among a broad gamut of laws reg-
ulating convicted sex offenders. Legislation aimed specifically at sex offen-
ders dates as far back as the 1930s, when many states passed laws permitting
the indefinite civil commitment of ‘‘sexual psychopaths.’’19 In the 1990s,
a new wave of civil commitment laws—this time styled as ‘‘sexual predator’’
laws—gained momentum, committing offenders in addition to (not in lieu
of) their prison terms.20 Legal regulations governing post-release sex offen-
ders rapidly proliferated following Congress’s passage of the Jacob Wetter-
ling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration
Act in 1994, which required states to generate registries of convicted sex
offenders.21 Within a few years, every state had its own sex offender reg-
istration law. Registries were soon followed by community notification
laws, conventionally known as Megan’s Law,22 which made these registries
public. Before long, residency, employment, and travel restrictions were
added to the list.23
Constitutional challenges to the legal regulation of sex offenders have
met with little overall success. In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld Kansas’s
civil commitment statute, concluding that the law comported with due
process, did not subject the offender to double jeopardy, and was not an ex
217.735 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40, 208.40A(c) (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.
2.1 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2011).
18. Corsaro, supra note 5, at 412; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (2012); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (2017);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520n(1) (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (2017); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-208.40, 208.40A(c) (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.2.1 (2006); WIS. STAT. §
301.48 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43,
55 (1998); Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the ‘‘Sex Psychopath’’ Statute:
From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897
(1995).
20. Corsaro, supra note 5, at 404.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
22. The laws are so named because Congressional support for sex offender registration
was spurred by the death of Megan Kanka at the hands of a convicted child molester. See
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003) (explaining that Kanka’s death inspired legislative
action).
23. See J.J. Prescott, Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release Regulations and Sex Offender
Recidivism, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2016).
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post facto punishment.24 In 2003, the Court similarly rejected an ex post
facto challenge to Alaska’s sex offender registration and community noti-
fication laws, and a due process challenge to Connecticut’s online sex
offender registry.25 Although a few state supreme courts, federal district
courts, and federal courts of appeal have struck down particularly onerous
or vague sex offender registration, notification, and residency restriction
laws in recent years, most courts remain unmoved.26 In large part, laws
regulating sex offenders have been insulated from constitutional scrutiny
by their ostensibly ‘‘civil’’ character, notwithstanding their clear ties to
issues of crime and punishment.27 Legal challenges to the technological
monitoring of sex offenders are only just beginning to percolate through
the courts, but to date, these have not shown much promise of altering this
trend.28
I I . SEARCH ING SEX OFFENDERS
Historically, the Fourth Amendment has not offered purchase for push-
back to laws regulating convicted sex offenders.29 However, a ‘‘quiet rev-
olution’’ in Fourth Amendment law may reveal hitherto unrealized
constraints on the permissible scope of technological monitoring of con-
victed sex offenders.30 This Part outlines the current state of Fourth
Amendment law as it pertains to sex offender monitoring regimes. It traces
the re-emergence of the so-called ‘‘trespass’’ test for identifying whether
24. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
25. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105–06; Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
26. See Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the Punitiveness of ‘‘New Generation’’ SORN Laws
(in this Issue).
27. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 161–66.
28. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding Tennessee’s sex
offender monitoring statute in the face of another ex post facto claim).
29. See, e.g., Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting Fourth
Amendment challenge to sex offender registration act); Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217,
1226–27 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to requirement that
registered sex offenders provide state with online identifiers and passwords); Roe v. Mar-
cotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to creation
of sex offender DNA data bank).
30. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Andrew Tutt, Offensive Searches: Toward A Two-Tier
Theory of Fourth Amendment Protection, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104 (2017).
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particular governmental conduct effects a search, the development that laid
the groundwork for extending Fourth Amendment protections to techno-
logical monitoring of sex offenders. It then outlines the ‘‘reasonableness’’
framework for assessing whether a given search—and ultimately a state’s
sex offender monitoring scheme—is constitutional. Using a recent decision
from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals as a lens, it concludes by
highlighting the range of governmental interests likely to hold sway with
courts that must be weighed against the intrusiveness of a given monitoring
regime.
A. Property and Privacy: Reorienting the Fourth Amendment Inquiry
For most of the last fifty years, the arc of Fourth Amendment search
jurisprudence was thought to be linear. The text of the Fourth Amendment
secures ‘‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’’ against searches and seizures
that are unreasonable.31 Consistent with that text, early Fourth Amend-
ment protections largely tracked private property rights—a ‘‘search’’
occurred when the government physically invaded a constitutionally pro-
tected space.32 In the late 1960s, however, Katz v. United States signaled
a sea change in constitutional search analysis. Declaring that ‘‘the Consti-
tution protects people, not places,’’ the Katz Court announced that a search
occurs whenever a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy is violated,
regardless of whether the invasion attended a physical trespass.33 In the
conventional telling of this story, the ‘‘reasonable expectation of privacy’’
test that emerged from Katz was an evolution (or perhaps revolution)
that replaced the classic trespass doctrine and reoriented the Fourth
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928) (holding that no
Fourth Amendment ‘‘search’’ occurred where the government tapped telephone wires
outside of a suspect’s premises), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942)
(holding that no Fourth Amendment ‘‘search’’ occurred where the government placed
a recording device against the outer wall of a suspect’s office), with Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that a Fourth Amendment ‘‘search’’ occurred when
the government inserted a microphone into a suspect’s wall because that action constituted
a legal trespass).
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (‘‘We conclude that . . . the ‘trespass’
doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling. . . .The fact that the electronic devices
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance.’’).
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Amendment around notions of privacy rather than property.34 In the
decades following Katz, many other traditional Fourth Amendment doc-
trines were similarly recast in the language of privacy.35
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones, however,
unsettled this account of Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence. Writ-
ing for a majority of the Court, Justice Scalia proclaimed that Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test ‘‘has been added to, not substituted
for, the common-law trespassory test.’’36 Ironically, the impetus for resus-
citating the decades-old trespass doctrine was the government’s deploy-
ment of modern monitoring technology. In Jones, federal agents had
secretly installed a GPS tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle without
a valid warrant to do so.37 Under the Supreme Court’s historical prece-
dents, the information collected by the GPS device—the movement of an
automobile on public roads—was arguably not private.38 Thus, the gov-
ernment’s actions were unlikely to run afoul of the Katz test, barring some
novel proclamation from the Court about the quantum of information
gathered or the technological means employed.39 Instead, the Jones Court
34. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT.
REV. 67, 67–68 (2013).
35. For example, the Supreme Court had long held that no Fourth Amendment ‘‘search’’
occurs when police investigate open fields because of an old common law distinction
between open fields and houses, only the latter of which are explicitly protected by the
Fourth Amendment. SeeHester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). Following Katz, the
Supreme Court has couched the same result in the rhetoric of privacy, holding that ‘‘an
individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in
fields.’’ Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
36. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012). Throughout this Essay, we occasionally refer to the
rule articulated in Jones, as Justice Scalia did, as a ‘‘trespass’’ test. While we find this a useful
shorthand, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence both before and since
Jones evidences that the test does not require an actual trespass, in the legal sense, but rather
a physical occupation of a private space. See generally Kerr, supra note 34.
37. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03.
38. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (‘‘A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.’’). The District Court in Jones had suppressed any
GPS data collected while vehicle was parked in a private garage. United States v. Jones, 451
F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. United States v.
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part on other grounds sub nom.United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
39. Supreme Court commentators had anticipated that the case would be a test of the
‘‘mosaic’’ theory of Fourth Amendment searches, which holds that the aggregation of large
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ruled that the installation of the GPS device itself was a Fourth Amend-
ment search, irrespective of the privacy of the information collected.40
Emphasizing that the government ‘‘physically occupied private property
for the purpose of obtaining information,’’ Justice Scalia reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment must, at a minimum, provide today’s citizens with the
same protection against trespassory governmental surveillance that it af-
forded at the time it was adopted.41 In its next Term, the Court again
eschewed the Katz test in a Fourth Amendment case, emphasizing instead
the ‘‘physical intrusion’’ involved in a police dog search of the curtilage of
a home.42
Jones set the stage for the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision inGrady v. North
Carolina.43 The Grady case involved a challenge to a North Carolina statute
imposing satellite-based monitoring on recidivist sex offenders.44 By author-
ity of the statute, Dale Grady was ordered to wear a monitoring device at all
times for the rest of his life.45 The state courts had rejected Grady’s claims
that the monitoring was an unconstitutional search or seizure, reasoning that
the lessons of Jones did not extend into a non-investigative context—North
Carolina’s monitoring program was civil in nature, and its purported aim
was not the collection of evidence but rather the deterrence of future
quantities of erstwhile non-private information may violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy. See Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth
Amendment, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 27, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/
supreme-court-agrees-to-review-case-on-gps-and-the-fourth-amendment/. For more on the
mosaic theory, see discussion infra Part III.B.
40. Jones, 565 U.S. at 402, 411–12.
41. Id. at 404–05, 411. See also id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the
trespass test as ‘‘an irreducible constitutional minimum’’). The commitment to preserving
historical levels of constitutional protection in the face of emerging technology has been
championed in recent years by Professor Orin Kerr. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-
Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011). Previously,
a similar sentiment had been advanced by Professor Geoffrey Stone. See Geoffrey R. Stone,
The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and
Informers, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1193 (1976). For counterarguments, see David Alan
Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 223, 233–41 (2015).
42. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
43. Grady, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015).
44. Id. at 1369. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14–208.40(a)(1), 14–208.40B
(2013).
45. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1369.
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crimes.46 The Supreme Court, however, rejected those distinctions, remind-
ing the courts below (and the rest of us) that the Fourth Amendment has
a long history governing civil searches for purposes other than the collection
of criminal evidence.47 In a per curium opinion, theGradyCourt announced
simply that the North Carolina monitoring program involves a Fourth
Amendment search because it ‘‘is plainly designed to obtain information’’
and ‘‘does so by physically intruding on a subject’s body.’’48
The consensus lesson of Jones (and Grady) is that the nonconsensual,
physical occupation of ‘‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’’ for the pur-
pose of collecting information triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny, sep-
arate and apart from any claim to the privacy of the information that results
from that occupation.49 But this is at most a half-victory for those con-
cerned about limiting the potential excesses of technological governmental
surveillance. After all, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches.50 Although Jones andGrady both held that a ‘‘search’’ had occurred,
and thus that each governmental effort was subject to the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment, both cases left open the question whether those
searches were unreasonable (and hence constitutionally impermissible). The
Jones Court concluded that the government had waived its argument that
GPS monitoring was reasonable by failing to raise it in the Court of
Appeals.51 The Grady Court, meanwhile, expressly declined to analyze the
reasonableness of North Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring of sex offen-
ders regime in the first instance, punting the issue to the state courts.52
46. See State v. Grady, 759 S.E.2d 712 (N.C. App. 2014) (relying on State v. Jones, 750 S.
E.2d 883 (2013)); see also Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371 (noting that ‘‘the North Carolina Court of
Appeals apparently placed decisive weight on the fact that the State’s monitoring program is
civil in nature’’).
47. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1834 (2016) (‘‘Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects against trespass-like acts, that a physical
intrusion was a trespass-like act, and that affixing the GPS device to the car was a physical
intrusion.’’); Brennan-Marquez & Tutt, supra note 30, at 115–16 (‘‘Trespass searches violate
the Fourth Amendment even if they infringe on no expectations of privacy at all.’’).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).
52.Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. On remand, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina recently
concluded that the state failed to show that the search was reasonable, both with respect to
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It is the half-victory that Grady represents that makes this a key consti-
tutional moment for previously incarcerated sex offender monitoring laws.
By announcing that the current forms of technological monitoring of sex
offenders effects a Fourth Amendment search, without passing judgment
on the ultimate constitutional question of reasonableness, the Supreme
Court sowed considerable uncertainty on a civil liberties question of major
importance.
B. ‘‘Unreasonable’’ Searches: Governmental Interests and
Citizen Intrusion
For much of the last century, the Supreme Court seemingly embraced what
has been termed the ‘‘warrant preference’’ view of the Fourth Amend-
ment.53 Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not state pre-
cisely when a search warrant is required,54 the Supreme Court has
repeatedly proclaimed that searches conducted without a warrant—or, at
the very least, outside of a judicial process involving prior approval by
a judge or a magistrate—are per se unreasonable, ‘‘subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’’55 This is where
scholars well-versed in criminal procedure are likely to chuckle. In appli-
cation, the ‘‘specifically established and well-delineated’’ exceptions
the state’s specific interest in monitoring Grady and with respect to the efficacy of its
offender monitoring program more generally. State v. Grady, No. COA17-12, 2018 WL
2206344, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. May 15, 2018).
53. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (‘‘But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ is to be read in conjunction with its command that ‘no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.’’’). See also generally Cynthia Lee, Reason-
ableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J.
1133 (2012).
54. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (citing California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (‘‘What [the text]
explicitly states regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than
requirement of their use.’’)); Nikolaus Williams, Note, The Supreme Court’s Ahistorical
Reasonableness Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1522, 1527 (2014)
(‘‘The first clause establishes a standard (reasonableness) but does not explain what it means.
The second clause states the requirements for a valid warrant but does not explain when
warrants are required.’’).
55. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015).
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abound.56 They can be found where the government’s interests are sub-
stantial,57 time-bound,58 or unique;59 or where the comparative intrusion
on privacy is slight,60 fleeting,61 or experienced by those who are deemed to
have a reduced expectation of privacy from the outset.62
Increasingly, the Supreme Court has allowed this view to give up the
ghost. In recent years, the Court has proclaimed that reasonableness is the
‘‘ultimate touchstone’’ of Fourth Amendment analysis, and it has begun to
perform explicitly that comparison of interests that it had historically
engaged in subtextually.63 Although there are many different formulations
of the reasonableness standard, the constitutionality of a warrantless search
ultimately turns on an all-things-considered comparison of the govern-
ment’s legitimate interests against the intrusiveness of the search for those
subject to it.64 This is a key development with respect to sex offender
monitoring regimes, which may not fall neatly into established categorical
exceptions and yet are not ordinarily supported by a warrant and probable
cause.65 In fact, in Grady itself, despite the absence of a warrant, the
56. See, e.g., Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of
the Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 170 (2008) (identifying ‘‘some twenty
exceptions including searches incident to arrest, automobile searches, stop and frisk
searches, plain view searches, consent searches, border searches, administrative searches of
regulated businesses, exigent circumstances, welfare searches, inventory searches, airport
searches, school searches, searches of mobile homes, and searches of offices of public
employees’’).
57. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (exigent circumstances).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1973) (hot pursuit).
59. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760–66 (2010) (holding that
a warrantless search was reasonable due to the special needs of the workplace environment).
60. See, e.g., Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178 (roadside breathalyzer).
61. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (stop and frisk).
62. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850–55 (2006) (holding that a war-
rantless, suspicionless search of parolee was permissible because of parolee’s diminished
expectation of privacy and government’s substantial interest in supervising parolees).
63. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
64. Quon, 560 U.S. at 761 (explaining that searches must be reasonably related to
a legitimate interest and not excessively intrusive in light of the circumstances giving rise to
the search).
65. Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent turn toward a general ‘‘reasonableness’’ standard,
the most likely Fourth Amendment doctrinal avenue for assessing the technological
monitoring of convicted sex offenders who are ‘‘off paper’’ (i.e., not on probation or parole)
would have been the ‘‘special needs’’ doctrine, which permits so-called suspicionless
‘‘administrative searches’’ in service of goals other than law enforcement. See generally
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Supreme Court remanded the case with an explicit directive for the North
Carolina Supreme Court to consider ‘‘the totality of the circumstances,
including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the
search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.’’66
Although Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a holistic evaluation, we
are fortunate to have a few guideposts. A reasonable warrantless search
typically must be tailored to its aims with roughly the same level of spec-
ificity as would be authorized by a valid warrant.67 The means by which
a search is conducted should therefore be ‘‘reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’’68 It is
worth emphasizing the word ‘‘circumstances’’ and keeping in mind that
each instance of monitoring is a distinct and separate search. In the context
of the technological monitoring of convicted sex offenders, this means that
the requisite balance is not merely between the governmental interests that
justify a monitoring program broadly and the extent of the intrusion
experienced by an individual offender.69 Rather, ‘‘as the Court has repeat-
edly recognized, the means of surveillance, the nature of the technology at
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.’s Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug
testing for railroad workers). The special needs doctrine is a questionable fit given that at
least some of the interests served by sex offender monitoring statutes are the specific
deterrence of the offender and the collection of evidence in the event that deterrence is
unsuccessful. Cf. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000) (noting that the Court is
‘‘particularly reluctant’’ to find special needs ‘‘where governmental authorities primarily
pursue their general crime control ends’’). For the Fourth Amendment rights of sex offen-
ders on probation or parole, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
66. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. Because challenges to sex offender monitoring laws like the
one at issue in Grady are most likely to brought in federal court under 42U.S.C. § 1983, this
raises the specter of so-called ‘‘double reasonableness’’: the substantive constitutional
violation requires that the search be unreasonable, while the availability of remedy turns
on a separate assessment of the reasonableness of the violation. See generally Sam Kamin &
Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV.
589 (2014).
67. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
68. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (articulating a two-step test to
measure the reasonableness of a search).
69. Of course, the individualized assessment of technological monitoring also carries the
potential to enlarge the government’s interests with respect to certain offenders (e.g., those
with demonstrably high recidivism rates) relative to those interests that justify monitoring at
a programmatic level.
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issue, and its potential for abuse must be considered as well.’’70 Various
critical facets of each search, therefore, play a role in the reasonableness
determination.
Since Grady was decided in 2015, only one federal circuit court has
resolved a Fourth Amendment challenge to the technological monitoring
of sex offenders. The majority opinion in that case, Belleau v. Wall,71
exemplifies the strong weight courts are inclined to assign to the govern-
ment’s interest in implementing technological monitoring programs
against formerly incarcerated people. Writing for a panel of the Seventh
Circuit that unanimously declared the monitoring program constitutional,
Judge Posner emphasized that Wisconsin’s statute worked ‘‘to deter future
offenses by making the plaintiff aware that he is being monitored and is
likely therefore to be apprehended should a sex crime be reported at a time,
and a location, at which he is present.’’72 Underscoring the gravity of the
need for deterrence, Posner dedicated no less than six well-sourced para-
graphs of his opinion to the rampant underreporting of sex crimes and to
the impact that underreporting has on recidivism statistics, seeking to
dispel any hint that the offender in the case might ‘‘be thought just a harm-
less old guy.’’73 As a seemingly final nail in the coffin, Posner invited
‘‘[r]eaders of this opinion who are parents of young children [to] ask
themselves whether they should worry that there are people in their com-
munity who have ‘only’ a 16 percent or an 8 percent probability of molest-
ing young children—bearing in mind the lifelong psychological scars that
such molestation frequently inflicts.’’74
Where Judge Posner’s opinion falls short, however, is in assessing the
intrusion that Wisconsin’s technological monitoring statute imposes on
offenders. Speaking of the ankle monitor technology challenged in the
case, Posner noted in passing that ‘‘such devices are also used by some
70. Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS
Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches,
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 182 (2011).
71. Belleau, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).
72. Id. at 935.
73. See id. at 933–34.
74. Id. We do not comment (here) on whether this representation of the risk sex of-
fenders pose to communities is accurate. For our purposes, we assume that at least some sex
offenders do pose an elevated risk and therefore there is at least some governmental interest
in passing and enforcing post-release sex offender laws that seek to lower this risk.
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parents to keep track of their kids or elderly relatives and by some hikers
and mountain climbers to make sure they know where they are at all times
or to track their speed.’’75 Later, he characterized having to wear the
monitor as ‘‘a bother, an inconvenience, an annoyance,’’ but nothing
more.76 He further insisted that, since the plaintiff’s name and address
were already on the public sex offender registry, there was little ‘‘additional
loss [of privacy] from the fact that occasionally his trouser leg hitches up
and reveals an anklet monitor that may cause someone who spots it to guess
that this is a person who has committed a sex crime.’’77 Displaying an
oddly anachronistic understanding of surveillance, Posner juxtaposed a life-
time of 24/7 GPS monitoring, which ‘‘just identifies locations,’’ with ‘‘seri-
ous’’ privacy violations, such as ‘‘if the Department of Corrections were
following the plaintiff around, peeking through his bedroom window,
trailing him as he walks to the drug store or the local Starbucks, videotaping
his every move, and through such snooping learning . . . ‘whether he is
a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful
husband,’ etc.’’78
That Judge Posner seemed dismissive of the privacy intrusions expe-
rienced by a sex offender—one whom he repeatedly labeled as ‘‘pedo-
phile,’’ as if to remind the reader of his diminished worth—is hardly
surprising. Convicted sex offenders are rarely sympathetic, and tend to
arouse anger and disgust in the public.79 However, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly admonished that even the most pressing governmental
interests cannot act as a license for indiscriminate police behavior.80 As
the remainder of this Essay demonstrates, the imposition of technological
75. Id. at 931.
76. Id. at 937.
77. Id. at 935. We are reminded of Justice Douglas’s admonitions in Osborn v. United
States:
These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend whereby the privacy and
dignity of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken
individually, each step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there
begins to emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen—a society in which government
may intrude into the secret regions of man’s life at will.
385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935.
79. Prescott, supra note 23, at 1041.
80. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013).
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monitoring on sex offenders is no small matter. And, as the wide state-to-
state variation in such programs evidences, monitoring is also malleable—
it can be implemented in ways that are more or less intrusive and in ways
that are more or less tailored to accomplish the government’s goals.81 It is
thus an open and evolving question whether and how technological
monitoring can be implemented ‘‘reasonably,’’ consistent with the secu-
rity that the Fourth Amendment guarantees to all citizens, regardless of
their past crimes.
I I I . THE D IMENS IONS OF INTRUS ION
Notwithstanding the arguably substantial governmental interests at stake in
monitoring convicted sex offenders, technological monitoring imposes real
and substantial burdens on the individuals subject to it. Proper constitu-
tional analysis requires taking those intrusions seriously.82 As the Supreme
Court has stated, ‘‘The gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of
questions concerning what means law enforcement may employ to pursue
a given purpose.’’83 The sections that follow each offer a sketch of the
theoretical, doctrinal, and practical arguments that might be advanced with
respect to assessing the intrusiveness of technological monitoring as
a Fourth Amendment ‘‘search.’’ Without purporting to be an exhaustive
survey, these sections underscore the variety of dimensions along which
offender monitoring programs may potentially be intrusive and which have
proven doctrinal relevance under the Fourth Amendment. In practice,
measuring the intrusiveness of a search will of course be a heavily fact-
bound inquiry, likely turning on the precise technology used, the amount
81. We note that the Supreme Court has at times proven unsympathetic to arguments
focused on comparing a challenged search program to less-invasive alternatives. See, e.g.,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 n.12 (1976) (‘‘The logic of such elaborate
less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of vir-
tually all search-and-seizure powers.’’). We direct the reader to the use of the word ‘‘elab-
orate,’’ however, which would seem to exclude obvious, costless ways to reduce
intrusiveness.
82. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (‘‘The overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by the State.’’).
83. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 32–33 (2000).
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and nature of information collected, and the specifics of the statute that
authorizes the practice. Many of these features, however, can be individu-
alized, tailoring surveillance to offender circumstances, and often entail
technologically feasible (although not costless) adjustments that can reduce
the burdens of monitoring. By identifying these distinct dimensions of
intrusion, our aim is to elucidate the many (and sometimes countervailing)
considerations that should inform how the government can conduct tech-
nological monitoring in ways that are consistent with Fourth Amendment
expectations.84
A. Extending the Trespass Test: Physical Invasions
Potentially the most interesting question following Grady is also the most
unsettled: How heavily does the physical intrusion imposed by a given sex
offender monitoring technology weigh in the assessment of whether
a search is reasonable? For nearly a half-century, the privacy-centric focus
of Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence largely reduced the question of
intrusiveness to one of data flows.85 As a result, case law assessing the
intrusiveness of the government’s physical invasions under the Fourth
Amendment is rare.86 Further, it is possible that the trespass test articulated
in Jones will eventually prove to be relevant primarily (or perhaps even
84. In deploying this method, we see our Essay as complementary to the work of notable
Fourth Amendment scholars who have isolated and clarified separate strains of jurispru-
dence that too often fall under a single label. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
85. For a criticism of this state of affairs, see generally David A. Sklansky, Too Much
Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. 1069 (2014).
86. One such rare exception are Section 1983 civil rights suits claiming that government
agents used excessive force (typically when conducting a seizure). See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989) (holding that such claims are properly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment, rather than substantive due process). However, those cases have
limited analogical value for evaluating the technological monitoring of sex offenders. They
commonly involve the snap judgments of police in the field, rather than programmatic
decisions, are bound up with complicated questions of qualified immunity, and primarily
surface in the most extreme fact patterns, such as those involving the death of a criminal
suspect. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 310–11 (2015); Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
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exclusively) to the threshold inquiry of whether a search occurred, rather
than to an assessment of that search’s reasonableness. We note, for exam-
ple, that the Grady Court itself returned to the language of ‘‘reasonable
privacy expectations’’ when it instructed the North Carolina courts to
assess the intrusiveness of sex offender monitoring.87
We doubt that the Jones trespass test can be so cabined, however. The
majority opinion in Jones turns almost exclusively on the (relatively minor)
physical invasion involved in surreptitiously attaching an inconspicuous GPS
device to the underside of a vehicle. It was this physical invasion that allowed
the JonesCourt to distinguish two prior precedents in which the Court found
that the government’s use of technological monitoring to collect similar
information did not invade defendants’ privacy.88 Jones is thus best read as
supporting the commonsense proposition that the means of a search matter
to whether the search is constitutional89: A physical invasion by the govern-
ment to collect information is a constitutionally significant event, irrespective
of the nature of the information it succeeds in collecting.
One useful analog for understanding the weight of physical intrusion in
Fourth Amendment analysis came just one year after Grady, when the
Supreme Court evaluated the reasonableness of two different methods for
evaluating the blood-alcohol content of suspected drunk drivers.90 The
Court concluded that a warrantless ‘‘breathalyzer’’ search is reasonable in part
because ‘‘the physical intrusion is almost negligible.’’91 Analogizing the test to
87. Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015).
88. SeeUnited States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (reasoning that the prior ‘‘beeper’’ cases
did not involve a trespass because the device was installed in the relevant containers prior to
the defendant taking possession). See alsoUnited States v. Karo, 468U.S. 705 (1984); United
States v. Knotts, 460U.S 276 (1983). To be clear, the Karo Court held that the government’s
monitoring of the beeper did constitute a Fourth Amendment search once it revealed non-
public information about the suspect’s residence, but not when revealing publicly available
information—information such as the location of a vehicle on public roads or the location
of a container in an open field. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
89. Illustrative of the distinction that Justice Scalia was drawing, prior cases were akin to
a suspect inviting a wired-up informant into his business (a situation that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly found not to be a search), whereas the physical intrusion in Jonesmore
closely parallels the surreptitious instillation of a microphone into the wall. See Jones, 565
U.S. at 410 (citing On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751–52 (1952)). See also Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that a Fourth Amendment ‘‘search’’
occurred when the government inserted a microphone into a suspect’s wall).
90. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
91. Id. at 2176.
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drinking out of a straw or blowing up a party balloon, the Court concluded
that the search required ‘‘nothing painful or strange’’ of the suspect.92 The
Court, however, struck down compulsory blood tests largely because of the
extent of the physical invasion involved, describing the tests as requiring the
piercing of the skin to ‘‘extract a part of the subject’s body.’’93 The Court
further explained that the blood test’s reasonableness ‘‘must be judged in light
of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test.’’94
Taking a stab at a preliminary framework, we might think of physical
intrusion as existing on a spectrum. At one end of this spectrum are
‘‘strange or painful’’ technologies. Although individuals might disagree over
the comparative levels of intrusion of specific devices, this end of the
spectrum likely includes technologies that require surgical implantation,
those that physically implicate portions of the body, and those that cause
substantial or long-lasting or chronic pain. At the opposite end of this
spectrum would be the least invasive technologies, those akin to simply
breathing into a breathalyzer. For example, one can imagine a hypothetical
program for sex offender monitoring that requires merely the downloading
of a smart phone app and the periodic logging of location through bio-
metric identification on the phone, perhaps by fingerprint or facial recog-
nition technology that is already nearly ubiquitous in American society.
Assuming that the trespass rationale of Jones andGrady would extend to the
app’s ‘‘intrusion’’ on the smartphone—its occupation of the owner’s elec-
tronic circuits, stored energy, and memory95—the comparative physical
92. Id. at 2177. The Supreme Court has likewise upheld the constitutionality of inves-
tigative practices like cheek swabs and fingernail scrapings involving only ‘‘negligible’’ or
‘‘very limited’’ physical intrusions. See King, 569U.S. at 446–47; Cupp v. Murphy, 412U.S.
291, 296 (1973).
93. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178. The Supreme Court has elsewhere described ‘‘compelled
surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence’’ as implicating ‘‘expectations of
privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if
likely to produce evidence of a crime.’’ SeeWinston v. Lee, 470U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the state from surgically extracting a bullet from
a criminal suspect in order to collect evidence).
94. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
95. In his Jones concurrence, Justice Alito anticipated that a trespass test ‘‘will present
particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making
electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked.’’ United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 426 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (offering the example of police
surreptitiously activing a car’s stolen vehicle detection system). Moreover, in 2016, the
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intrusion experienced by the offender would be rather minimal. From this
basic framework, we can then add nuance. For example, haptic feedback
technologies that use vibration or other forms of physical or auditory
force to notify an offender of potential violations would likely add to the
experienced intrusiveness, even if the device was otherwise physically
unimposing,96 in the same way we can imagine a breathalyzer that is
designed in a way to be painful or strange to use.
Currently available monitoring technology sits somewhere in the middle
of this continuum. First-hand accounts from Michigan sex offenders subject
to lifetime monitoring reveal the substantial physical burden technological
monitoring devices can impose. The device used for lifetime monitoring in
Michigan at the time was even larger than a traditional GPS ankle monitor.97
The weight of the device could rub the underlying skin raw or cut into the
skin and cause bleeding.98 The device is designed to vibrate for particular
alerts, and can also cause electric shocks when it malfunctions.99 Technolog-
ical monitoring can also be physically incapacitating: the technology used in
Michigan required the offender to remain plugged into a wall outlet for at
least two hours each day to allow the device to charge.100 Charging cannot
realistically be performed while sleeping because movement will disconnect
the charger, triggering a vibration that further disrupts sleep.101 Individuals
subjected to devices of this sort appear to view them as similar to a classic ball
and chain, which might have weighed only 18 pounds,102 and yet was
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published a decision in which (then Circuit Judge, now
Supreme Court Justice) Neil Gorsuch held that the government conducted a trespassory
Jones search without a physical invasion when it opened the defendant’s emails via a remote
web browser. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
96. Amazon recently made headlines when it patented worker monitoring wristbands
that could alert a worker to possible mistakes or deviations in a similar manner. See Ceylan
Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent for It.),
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-
wristband-tracking-privacy.html.
97. Brief for the ACLU of Mich. and the Crim. Def. Atty’s of Mich. as Amici Curiae,





102. Found: The Ball and Chain That May Have Condemned a 17th Century Prisoner to
a Watery Grave in the Thames, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 27, 2009, 10:28 AM), http://www
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nevertheless exasperating (and historically and socially salient) precisely
because its wearer could never be free of it.103 There was no lull in the
intrusion.
Against this backdrop, Judge Posner’s casual equating of offender moni-
toring technology with the GPS devices used to track ‘‘hikers,’’ ‘‘kids,’’ or
‘‘elderly relatives’’ is inaccurate and seems disingenuous.104 As Birchfield
demonstrates, one measure of the intrusiveness of a given technology is the
availability of a less invasive alternative.105 Yet thus far the devices used to
track sex offenders are substantially more onerous than consumer versions of
GPS technology.106 Consider that in the span of just a few years, GPS
monitoring technologies have not only advanced in technological sophisti-
cation, but have been dramatically reduced in their physical dimensions.107 A
modern-day GPS chip is approximately the size of a postage stamp; a similar
device from a decade earlier would have been more comparable to a thick
stack of index cards.108 In addition to being smaller and lighter, current
monitoring devices are often styled in ways that mimic traditional fashion
accessories—such as bracelets and wristwatches—and are therefore simply
less ‘‘strange’’ than the sizable ankle devices often used for offenders, which
are echoes of historical prisoner restraints, such as shackles and leg irons.109
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1209405/First-intact-ball-chain-drowned-prisoner-mud-
Thames.html.
103. Cf. Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147,
194–99 (2000) (discussing various ways in which burdens imposed by sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws result in a ‘‘hidden’’ custody sufficient to warrant
federal habeas corpus protection).
104. See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).
105. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178, 2184 (2016).
106. Some monitoring regimes require released sex offenders to pay for their own
monitors. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.285(2) (West 2006); Lifetime Electronic
Monitoring Program—Current Daily Rate, MICH. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIONS (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/Current_Daily_Rate_for_Lifetime_
Electronic_Monitoring_Program_353451_7.pdf. Although the practice of making criminal
offenders pay for their punishment is not uncommon, see Cook, supra note 3, having
released sex offenders pay for the government to search them may be relevant to the extent
of the Fourth Amendment intrusion.
107. See Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the Post-United States v. Jones
Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 553, 560–65 (2015).
108. See id. at 563–64.
109. Although shackles and leg irons are not ‘‘strange’’ in at least one sense—they have
a long history of use—the Birchfield Court’s reference to ‘‘painful or strange’’ physical
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This comparison suggests a lasting significance for Jones in non-
investigative contexts. Some commentators have questioned the utility of
a Fourth Amendment trespass test, given that the need of law enforcement
to reduce inconvenience and the risk of detection provides a strong incen-
tive for the government to continue developing and using less physically
intrusive monitoring technologies.110 Indeed, the pervasive use of con-
sumer technology that performs similar types of monitoring—from cellular
phones to vehicle navigation systems to personal fitness trackers—may
provide the government with avenues for surveillance that render physical
intrusion entirely unnecessary.111 For these reasons, we might correctly
anticipate that the number of successful Jones challenges to investigative
searches will be both small and decreasing in the face of technological
advancements. However, the same logic suggests that Jones may ultimately
have a lasting and substantial role to play in the post-release monitoring
context, in which the government lacks the same inherent incentives—
primarily, fear of detection and evasion—to develop and employ less
physically intrusive technologies. In fact, in these situations, individual
government actors may have colorable reasons for imposing a greater level
of physical intrusion than necessary—a cost borne solely by the citizen being
monitored—in service of seemingly sensible goals, such as the financial
savings (or simply the ease) of delaying upgrades to outdated technology.112
A Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that bars unreasonable physical intru-
sions, forcing the government to be thoughtful and careful in how it buys
and deploys monitoring technology, can change the landscape.
B. Too Much Information: A ‘‘Mosaic’’ Theory of Intrusion
In addition to intruding on individuals physically, the technological mon-
itoring of convicted sex offenders intrudes on those individuals’ privacy
intrusions operates by comparing the challenged intrusion to the everyday activities of
ordinary citizens. A breath test is minimally intrusive when it is analogous to drinking out of
a straw. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177. A blood test is significantly more intrusive when it is
analogous to a blood draw during an annual physical exam, a process that few relish and
some try to avoid. Id. at 2178. Shackles and leg irons lack a clear analog in everyday life, and
are therefore an indisputably ‘‘strange’’ form of physical intrusion for most citizens.
110. Miller, supra note 107, at 563.
111. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414–15 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
112. Moreover, government actors may view themselves as having an affirmative
incentive to increase the physical burden of a monitoring technology as a punitive measure.
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because it collects large quantities of information. Although Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion in Jones emphasized the physical trespass involved, five
members of the Jones Court also expressed concerns that extended moni-
toring would amount to a Fourth Amendment search even under the Katz
test. Justice Sotomayor joined Scalia’s majority opinion, relying on trespass,
but also wrote separately to offer her view that technological advances may
uniquely threaten citizen privacy by allowing a depth of surveillance not
previously possible at a fraction of the cost of traditional methods.113 She
expressed not only doubt that ‘‘people reasonably expect that their move-
ments will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Gov-
ernment to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious
beliefs, sexual habits, and so on,’’ but also unease at the government’s
wielding ‘‘a tool so amenable to misuse.’’114 Justice Alito’s concurrence,
joined by three other Justices, likewise emphasized the intrusiveness of
extended technological surveillance.115 Calling the four-week continuous
tracking of the suspect’s vehicle ‘‘lengthy,’’ Alito reasoned that ‘‘society’s
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—
and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.’’116
At the core of these Justices’ concerns is what has come to be known as
the ‘‘mosaic theory’’ of Fourth Amendment privacy—‘‘the idea that certain
types of governmental investigation enable accumulation of so many indi-
vidual bits about a person’s life that the resulting personality picture is
worthy of constitutional protection.’’117 Here is how the D.C. Circuit first
113. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (‘‘GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. . . .And because GPS monitoring is
cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’’’ (quoting Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
114. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416.
115. See id. at 418–19 (Alito, J. concurring). Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined
Alito’s concurrence.
116. Id. at 430.
117. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of the Mosaic Theory, 8DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
3–4 (2012).
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articulated the mosaic theory in United States v. Maynard, which became
Jones before the Supreme Court:
[The] whole reveals far more than the individual movements it comprises.
The difference is not one of degree but of kind, for no single journey reveals
the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life
and a way of life, nor the departure from a routine that, like the dog that did
not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal even more.118
Scholars and commentators have addressed at length the utility and prac-
ticability of adopting the mosaic theory.119 We do not intend to revisit that
ground. Rather, we are particularly interested in considering what weight,
if any, concerns about the intrusiveness of data aggregation have in ana-
lyzing whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable. The mosaic theory
is traditionally thought to be mostly relevant to the predicate question
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.120 However, the par-
ticular concerns about the intrusiveness of monitoring that drive the
mosaic theory in the first instance also seem apropos to resolving the
further question whether a specific search was constitutionally reasonable.
Consider again Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones. She identified
several ‘‘unique attributes of GPS surveillance’’ that require careful
attention.121 First, the monitoring is ‘‘precise’’ and ‘‘comprehensive.’’122 Sec-
ond, the government can store the records generated by monitoring technol-
ogies ‘‘and efficiently mine them for information years into the future.’’123
118. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945 (2012).
119. For a thorough overview of the origins of the mosaic theory, see Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
120. See id. at 312–13. As noted above, the Jones Court did not evaluate the reasonableness
of extended technological monitoring, despite five members of the Court endorsing
something akin to the mosaic theory. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413 (‘‘We consider the argument
[that the search was reasonable] forfeited.’’). See also id. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (noting that the intrusiveness of GPS monitoring is relevant to ‘‘the existence of
a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements,’’ but
declining to resolve that question); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that ‘‘the
lengthy monitoring that occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment’’ without analyzing whether the search was reasonable).
121. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id. Notably, the Supreme Court quietly expressed a similar concern about the
storage and future use of collected data in Birchfield, the breathalyzer and blood test case
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Taken together, she fears that these two features result in monitoring that
‘‘chills associational and expressive freedoms.’’124 Third, the technology is
(relatively) inexpensive, allowing the government to conduct searches uncon-
strained by the resource limitations that might have previously curtailed abu-
sive practices.125 All three concerns quite clearly extend to the technological
monitoring of convicted sex offenders. The first two of Sotomayor’s concerns
echo the work of legal scholars who claim that excessive surveillance can have
a crippling effect on individuals.126 For example, Jed Rubenfeld has argued
that the Fourth Amendment principally exists to protect an individual’s per-
sonal life, which he conceptualizes as a space ‘‘where people are supposed to be
free from the strictures of public norms, free to be their ownmen andwomen,
free to say what they actually think, and to act on their actual desires or
principles, even if doing so defies public norms.’’127 The third concern reflects
the longstanding fear that widespread surveillance will be destructive of the
relationship between citizens and the government.128 Although this idea has
never been given a special doctrinal formulation, courts and commentators
have long posited that the Fourth Amendment serves as a check against ‘‘a too
permeating police surveillance.’’129
Wisconsin’s technological monitoring program, at issue in Belleau,
entailed several programmatic decisions that arguably mitigate the set
from the same Term as Jones. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016)
(noting that blood samples can be preserved for some length of time and can reveal
information beyond blood-alcohol content, thus generating anxiety about unanticipated
future uses for those subjected to a blood draw). See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez &
Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Anxiety, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018).
124. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416.
125. Id. at 415–16.
126. See Sklansky, supra note 85, at 1095–97 (surveying the scholarship arguing for what
he terms the ‘‘stultification thesis’’—‘‘the belief that surveillance deters the kinds of activities
and communications necessary for people to lead full lives as individuals and democratic
citizens’’). See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 202–03 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (‘‘He who is subjected to a field of visibility, who knows it,
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon
himself; he inscribes in himself the power relations in which he simultaneously plays both
roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.’’).
127. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 128 (2008).
128. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1104–07 (2002) (articulating the dangers of
governmental information gathering).
129. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
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of concerns addressed by the mosaic theory. With respect to the concern
over increased police surveillance power due to reduced surveillance
costs, Judge Flaum in a concurring opinion explained that Wisconsin’s
monitoring program had, as a matter of course, relatively little police
involvement:
Police do not administer the program, or even access the GPS data unless
they have some reason to specifically request it. Even the Department of
Corrections does not review Belleau’s location in real-time, but only at the
end of each day. Additionally, the program is narrowly designed only to
track Belleau’s location.130
The use of third parties (including private parties) to perform governmental
tracking is actually quite common.131 An important question, however, is
whether the use of third parties has privacy benefits that might minimize
the intrusiveness of a government search. On the one hand, the raging
debate over the much-maligned third-party doctrine demonstrates that
people are particularly uncomfortable providing the government with
access to information that they freely, if often unknowingly, provide to
private companies.132 On the other hand, and perhaps relatedly, the dangers
of surveillance are increasingly understood to be a function of the interaction
of both public- and private-sector information collection.133 Although the
Wisconsin program ultimately put sex offender monitoring data in the hands
of its Department of Corrections in the first instance, rather than its police, it
does not erect any barriers to police accessing that data, other than the effort
of making the request. Moreover, by disseminating the information to
a larger number of parties, greater exposure occurs—to more people in more
roles. For the same reason, a monitoring program such as Wisconsin’s
increases the risk of data leakage and various other privacy harms—including
blackmail, coercion, and discrimination.134
A more promising feature of the Wisconsin program, at least from
a privacy perspective, is the lack of active monitoring. Judge Posner
130. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 941 (7th Cir. 2016) (Flaum, J., concurring).
131. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feliz, No. 16-00077, 2017 WL 1450461, at *2 (Mass.
Super. Apr. 21, 2017) (describing Massachusetts’s partnership with 3M).
132. See Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens’s Fourth
Amendment? 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1745 (2006).
133. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2013).
134. Id. at 1952–58.
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emphasized this fact in his Belleau opinion, juxtaposing problematic gov-
ernmental surveillance techniques—‘‘following the plaintiff around . . .
trailing him as he walks to the drug store or the local Starbucks’’—with
the nightly mapping conducted by the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections:
[E]very night the Department of Corrections makes a map of every anklet
wearer’s whereabouts that day so that should he be present at a place where
a sex crime has been committed, or be hanging around school playgrounds
or otherwise showing an abnormal interest in children not his own, the
police will be alerted to the need to conduct an investigation.135
In his concurrence, Judge Flaum described this as a lack of ‘‘real-time’’
monitoring, a characterization sometimes used by courts.136 But we think
that few of the privacy implications of active versus passive monitoring turn
solely on when the monitoring is conducted.137 Rather, the crux of the
concern about real-time monitoring appears to be that it draws the govern-
ment’s attention to large quantities of information that are irrelevant to the
ultimate aim of deterring future crime. As Posner alluded to in his opinion,
real-time, active monitoring requires that equal attention is paid to a con-
victed sex offender’s trip to Starbucks and his trip to a local school or
playground.138 Passive monitoring technologies, which alert law enforce-
ment only when the information collected suggests a problem (potentially
after some processing delay, as in Wisconsin’s daily mapping regime), are
135. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935.
136. A handful of courts have intimated that the constitutionality of cell phone location
tracking may depend on whether the information collected is ‘‘historical’’ rather than ‘‘real
time.’’ See, e.g., Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 512–19 (Fla. 2014) (surveying federal law). But
see Orin Kerr, ‘‘Florida Supreme Court Holds Real-Time Cell-Site Data Protected under
Fourth Amendment,’’ VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/16/florida-supreme-court-holds-real-time-cell-
site-data-protected-under-fourth-amendment (‘‘That distinction matters in the statutory
context because the Stored Communications Act expressly regulates historical access but
does not regulate real-time access. But I don’t see how it could matter for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment question of what is a ‘search.’’’).
137. The idea of persistent, real-time observation may feel inherently intrusive in the
abstract. But one can easily construct hypotheticals involving transmission delays of sec-
onds, minutes, or even hours that quickly undermine the instinct that timing, as opposed to
the nature and quantity of information collected, is the source of the intrusion.
138. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935.
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thus less intrusive in the sense that they are able to distinguish relevant
from irrelevant information.139
Being able to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information speaks
directly to Justice Sotomayor’s first two concerns—the propensity of com-
prehensive surveillance to produce chilling effects on associational and
expressive freedoms.140 Knowing that the government is watching may
dissuade monitored offenders from acting on their authentic preferences,
even with respect to activities that have nothing to do with the likelihood of
recidivism. Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment has protected against
‘‘dragnet’’ searches and ‘‘fishing expeditions’’ by requiring particularized
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing as a predicate to a search.141 ‘‘Particu-
larized suspicion keeps the government’s profound investigative powers in
check preventing widespread surveillance and snooping into the lives and
affairs of all citizens.’’142 In the context of sex offender monitoring, passive
monitoring technologies may function as a surrogate for a suspicion
requirement, and thus better comport with the animating principles of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reducing the salience of irrelevant informa-
tion or by keeping it from the authorities altogether.143
139. Real-time monitoring by a human does dangle the possibility of additional law
enforcement benefits, however: the intervention and prevention or disruption of a crime as
it is about to occur or is occurring (perhaps in an unexpected way that any passive mon-
itoring technology is less likely to detect). Passive monitoring as deployed seems to build in
a delay in law enforcement responsiveness and necessarily operates on the basis of backward-
looking offender behavioral patterns. As technology improves, alert systems relying on
advanced prediction technology may reduce or eliminate or even reverse any advantage
of a human being monitoring a sex offender in real time.
140. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
141. See Solove, supra note 128, at 1107. One of the paradigmatic evils that the Fourth
Amendment was enacted to restrain is the ‘‘indiscriminate rummaging’’ permitted by
general warrants. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion).
142. Solove, supra note 128, at 1109. Scholars concerned about the growing state of
governmental surveillance frequently tout similar benefits from Title I of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). See Richards, supra note 133, at 1962. The
ECPA requires that warrants for wiretaps be for a limited time and that the wiretapping be
‘‘conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of information not relevant to the
warrant.’’ Id. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
143.We note, however, that passive monitoring programs typically involve the storage of
monitoring data for some period of time. The preservation of such data raises the specter of
future mining and use by the government, which may be of constitutional significance. See
supra note 123.
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On this score, Wisconsin’s daily mapping regimen likely occupies a mid-
dle ground in its intrusiveness. All of the locations of a monitored individ-
ual in a given day are ultimately observed by the Department of
Corrections. But the aggregation of an entire day’s worth of movements
may minimize the attention paid to any particular movement, particularly
if the government is sincere in its assertion that the daily maps are used only
to evaluate whether the offender engaged in any conduct that warrants
further investigation by the police.144 Other, even less intrusive programs
are certainly possible. Massachusetts, for example, collects and preserves
location data, but does not typically review the data unless an automated
alert has been triggered by an event such as a monitored individual entering
an exclusion zone.145
C. ‘‘Intimacy’’ and Intrusion: Preserving Privacy at Home
While the informational privacy analysis set forth above emphasizes the
quantity of information the government collects, and who (and how often
they) can view it, the Fourth Amendment also imposes strict limitations on
the kind of information that may be collected through the technological
monitoring of convicted sex offenders. The Fourth Amendment has long
afforded special protection to information and locations associated with
traditionally ‘‘intimate’’ behavior, the home chief among them.146 Houses
are expressly included in the text of the Fourth Amendment as an
144. Judge Posner suggested a rather tenuous distinction between a device that ‘‘just
identifies locations’’ and one with the capability to ‘‘reveal what the wearer of the device is
doing at any of the locations.’’ See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 2016).
Obviously, one’s conduct can be inferred with some level of accuracy from one’s move-
ments, even if such inferences are at times off the mark. We are more persuaded that
Department of Corrections employees will be disinclined to spend the time and mental
effort necessary to draw such inferences in the first place when they are tasked with mapping
aggregated information in search of specific, suspicious movements.
145. See Commonwealth v. Feliz, No. 16-00077, 2017 WL 1450461, at *2 (Mass. Super.
Apr. 21, 2017).
146. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (‘‘[O]pen fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference . . . .’’); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972) (‘‘[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .’’).
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embodiment of the centuries-old respect afforded the sanctity and privacy
of the home.147 At times, the Supreme Court has implied that the Fourth
Amendment draws a clear line at the entrance to the home, including in
one of the earliest cases on technological monitoring.148 The Court has also
suggested more often of late that the constitutional protection of the home
serves to prophylactically protect the personal intimacies that typically take
place within that sphere.149
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the Fourth Amendment’s protection
of the intimacies of the home can be seen in Kyllo v. United States.150
There, the Supreme Court confronted the government’s use of technology
to detect heat signatures emanating from the exterior of a home.151 Tell-
ingly, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion framed the constitutional inquiry as
‘‘what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy.’’152 The Court expressed skepticism about the govern-
ment’s use of ‘‘a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion.’’153 Although the technology in question was deployed to con-
firm the suspected cultivation of marijuana, the Kyllo Court feared it might
equally be used to ‘‘disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady
of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.’’154 Despite offering this
particularly evocative (if problematic)155 depiction of an ‘‘intimacy’’ that
147. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 591–98 (1980) (proclaiming that
‘‘the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house’’ and surveying
English common law regarding warrantless entries into the home).
148. E.g. id.; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–18 (1984) (holding that a warrant
was required to monitor the signal of an electronic beeper once it entered a private home).
149. During oral argument in Carpenter v. United States, a case that will decide the
Fourth Amendment status of cell phone location data, Justice Sotomayor drew laughs with
her insight that the location data is emanating from a device that many now use on the toilet
and carry with them to bed. See Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, transcript pp. 42–43
(Nov. 29, 2017), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2017/16-402_3f14.pdf.
150. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
151. Id. at 29.
152. Id. at 34.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 38.
155. See Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97GEO. L. J. 485, 488–89 (2009) (highlighting
the ‘‘anachronism’’ of this imagery, which posits privacy as ‘‘a woman, the object of the male
gaze.’’). See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade,
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the Fourth Amendment shields from exposure, the Court explained that
the outcome does not depend on the specific information actually revealed
by the search: ‘‘In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details,
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.’’156 Kyllo
is thus paradigmatic of a broad trend in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
to protect from governmental intrusion the stereotypical American home.
One helpful approach to thinking about the Fourth Amendment’s tra-
ditional privileging of the home has been offered by Kerr’s ‘‘equilibrium-
adjustment theory’’ of the Fourth Amendment, which contends that judges
respond to new technologies and social practices by adjusting the Fourth
Amendment’s protections so as to restore a historical balance between the
needs of law enforcement and individual liberty.157 ‘‘When new tools and
new practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant
way, courts adjust the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try to
restore the prior equilibrium.’’158 Whether or not the judicial responses
that Kerr identifies are intentional efforts to restore a balance, an
equilibrium-adjustment theory of the Fourth Amendment has considerable
explanatory power. The Supreme Court, in particular, has frequently anal-
ogized modern-day governmental searches to historical Anglo-American
legal practices in order to evaluate their permissibility.
On an equilibrium-adjustment theory, we should expect that techno-
logical monitoring of sex offenders would be on its most tenuous consti-
tutional footing when it captures information within the home. As far back
as the dawn of the seventeenth century, an English court famously
observed that ‘‘the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress,
as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.’’159
William Blackstone reiterated that sentiment in his Commentaries on the
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE & LAW 101 (1983) (‘‘From this per-
spective, the legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape,
and women’s exploited labor; has preserved the central institutions whereby women are
deprived of identity, autonomy, control and self-definition; and has protected the primary
activity through which male supremacy is expressed and enforced.’’).
156. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
157. See Kerr, supra note 41, at 517–18.
158. Id. at 480.
159. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603). For a brief critique of the
wisdom of extending the historical castle metaphor to contemporary legal systems, see Ben
A. McJunkin, Rank Among Equals, 113 MICH. L. REV. 855, 870 (2015).
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Laws of England, noting that ‘‘the law of England has so particular and
tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle,
and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity. . . . For this reason no
doors can in general be broken open to execute any civil process; though, in
criminal causes, the public safety supersedes the private.’’160 Politicians,
courts, and commentators ensured that this principle became part of the
fabric of early American law. As Thomas Cooley observed in his famous
1868 constitutional law treatise, ‘‘it is better oftentimes that crime should go
unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises
invaded, his trunks broken open, his private books, papers, and letters
exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and
suspicious persons.’’161 And, indeed, the Supreme Court has routinely
struck down the government’s use of modern technology to collect infor-
mation about the interior of a citizen’s home.162
The technological monitoring of sex offenders thus poses a unique
Fourth Amendment dilemma. One would expect that a careful Fourth
Amendment analysis of technological monitoring would recognize that the
nature of information collected informs whether a search is reasonable by
taking into account whether the information in question is especially inti-
mate and whether it has any realistic connection to monitoring’s legitimate
goals (i.e., recidivism reduction). Modern GPS technology has the ability
to pinpoint a user’s location to within about three meters (roughly ten
feet).163 That level of accuracy is useful for effectively monitoring indivi-
duals’ movements outside of the home. Yet it is also quite possibly suffi-
cient to locate an individual within a specific room of a home. It is easy to
imagine that future monitoring technologies will be able to generate loca-
tion information that is even more precise and perhaps makes available
other details as well, such as a person’s directional orientation, whether the
person is standing or sitting or lying down (i.e., using altitude measure-
ments and gyroscope technology), etc. We may soon reach a point where
the government has the power not only to identify when the (monitored)
160. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 223 (1765–1769).
161. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
306 (1868).
162. E.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–18.
163. Tim Kolesk, Note, At the Intersection of Fourth and Sixth: GPS Evidence and the
Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2017).
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lady of the house takes her daily bath, but also to distinguish a trip to the
bath from a trip to the toilet. This would be an unprecedented level of
intrusion for the Fourth Amendment to countenance without a warrant or
an exception to it.
In addition, the nature of technological monitoring seems very likely to
continue to evolve beyond simple geolocation and physical orientation
tracking. Although monitoring devices that generate audio or video record-
ings within the home would likely be considered so invasive as to be
presumptively unreasonable, currently available consumer technology hints
at other avenues of possible intrusion into traditionally protected intima-
cies.164 Imagine, for example, a technological monitoring program that
outfitted convicted sex offenders with heartrate or blood pressure monitors
to detect patterns that might indicate heightened sexual arousal (and hence
a potential opportunity for recidivism). We might view such an intrusion as
beyond the pale, even where the information gained by monitoring has
some meaningful benefit to the government’s aims.165 Intrusions in this
category are almost instinctively offputting, and may be less amenable to
trade-offs than those in other categories.
These observations suggest that the government’s use of monitoring
technology may need to be tailored to preserve the sanctity of intimate
information within the home. Fortunately, there is no obvious reason why
technology that has additional monitoring capacity cannot also be fitted
with checks to allow extreme monitoring only when particularly justified,
with protections against intrusions in place whenever an individual is at
home. As it continues to develop, monitoring technology will become
better able to collect much more information, allowing greater depth and
focus, but also will become better able to algorithmically ‘‘unfocus’’ when
the information to hand is intimate or irrelevant. But, importantly, tech-
nology producers may require encouragement by courts or legislatures to
develop ways to limit the reach of their own products, since those who buy
and deploy monitoring technology are unlikely to worry too much about
164.One concern here is that courtsmay prove less willing to give normative privilege to the
intimacies of sex offenderswhohave demonstrated their divergence fromaccepted social norms.
165. Indeed, the level of intrusion seems to magnify if we imagine future technologies
that allow the monitoring to be more precise—e.g., monitoring for specific muscle con-
tractions, blood flow to specific body parts, or pupil dilation.
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overinclusive data collection—after all, extra, unnecessary data can always
be ignored—absent some pressure from government actors.
D. Search as Spectacle: Dignitary Harms and
the Fourth Amendment
A fourth, and final, dimension of intrusion relates to the visibility of
technological monitoring. To individuals being monitored, the visibility
of the technology to the public is one of the most tangible and salient
burdens that a governmental monitoring regime imposes. Wearable
technology—such as a traditional ankle monitor—immediately brands the
wearer as a criminal or other undesirable, inviting stigma, ostracism, and
even confrontation.166 Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence, however,
has historically had little to say about social stigma. Judges frequently
dispatch such arguments summarily, as if they are minor grievances of
no doctrinal significance.167 Meanwhile, scholarly consideration of the
spectacle of search remains rare, often classified as an outsider critique.168
Nevertheless, we view search stigma as a critical consideration because
many of the values that the Fourth Amendment aims to protect are threat-
ened or impinged by search practices that publicize past criminality and
ongoing suspicion.
Consider, for example, the disfavored constitutional status of ‘‘media
ride-alongs.’’ Early one morning in 1992, a team of U.S. Marshalls and
Maryland police officers attempted to execute arrest warrants for a known
fugitive by entering the residence listed as his address.169 Because the
excursion was part of a special national fugitive apprehension program—
dubbed ‘‘Operation Gunsmoke’’—the marshals had invited a reporter and
photographer from theWashington Post to accompany them.170 Unknown
to the government agents involved, however, they had actually entered the
166. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at *6, Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016)
(No. 15-3225) (recounting that ‘‘[a] neighbor who learned Belleau was a sex offender brand-
ished a gun and warned him to stay away, and others stopped speaking with him’’).
167. Consider Judge Posner’s minimizing description of the plaintiff’s burden in Belleau:
‘‘When the ankleted person is wearing trousers the anklet is visible only if he sits down and
his trousers hike up several inches and as a result no longer cover it.’’ Belleau, 811 F.3d at 932.
168. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
43, 68–69 (2009).
169. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1999).
170. Id.
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home of the fugitive’s parents, Charles and Geraldine Wilson.171 The Post’s
photographer captured the chaos that ensued. Believing him to be their
target, officers quickly subdued an angry, cursing Charles Wilson, dressed
only in a pair of briefs.172 Geraldine Wilson, dressed in a thin nightgown,
looked on.173 Eventually, the government agents learned that their true
target was not in the home, and they departed; the photographs of the
incident were never published.174 TheWilsons, however, brought a Section
1983 action seeking monetary damages for being subjected to an unreason-
able search.175
The Wilsons’ lawsuit reached the Supreme Court in the fall of 1998.
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the Court’s opinion, which began by
conceding that the government agents ‘‘were undoubtedly entitled to enter
the Wilson home in order to execute the arrest warrant.’’176 ‘‘But it does
not necessarily follow that they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter
and a photographer with them,’’ Rehnquist added.177 Doctrinally, the issue
before the Court was whether the media’s presence was so unrelated to the
purpose of the search as to render an otherwise lawful entry into the home
unreasonable.178 And, in fact, the government had identified several legit-
imate law enforcement goals that were arguably furthered by the media
ride-along, including the possibility that the presence of reporters might
protect suspects and minimize police abuses, much in the same way that
police dash cams and body cams are now justified.179 The Court was
unanimously unpersuaded.180 Justice Rehnquist (and the rest of theWilson
Court) drew a clear distinction between reasonable ‘‘quality control’’ mea-
sures, including potentially police-operated cameras, and the presence of
‘‘Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons’ home . . .working on a story
for their own purposes.’’181 This distinction hints at something deeper than
171. Id. at 606.
172. Id. at 607.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 607–08.
175. Id. at 608.
176. Id. at 611.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 611–13.
180. Justice Stevens concurred that the Fourth Amendment was violated, but dissented
on the separate question whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
181. Id. at 613.
414 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 21 | NO . 3 | SUMMER 2018
simply the purposelessness of a third party’s presence during a police search:
It was that the purpose was to publicize. It was the specter of spectacle that
was so troubling to the Court. Despite the fact that the Post had published
neither a story of the search nor any of the photographs taken, Rehnquist’s
opinion repeatedly framed the analysis in a way that emphasized the
unseemliness of bringing ‘‘the media’’ into a ‘‘private home.’’182
Wilson represents but one example of how the Fourth Amendment
constrains the methods police may use to accomplish their objectives. In
particular, the case suggests that publicity of criminality may itself be
a cognizable form of privacy invasion. It is far from alone in that respect.
The Supreme Court has at times weighed the ‘‘public stigma associated
with the search’’ in assessing the reasonableness of police conduct.183 It has
intimated that searches may be especially intrusive when they connote
criminality, serving as a ‘‘badge of shame.’’184 Lower federal courts have
repeatedly considered whether an otherwise lawful search or seizure was
rendered unreasonable by subjecting a suspect to the ‘‘stigma’’ and ‘‘indig-
nity’’ of remaining unclothed for a prolonged period.185 Scholars have
taken these privacy-based concerns about publicizing criminality even fur-
ther. Bill Stuntz once wrote about the ‘‘invasions of dignitary interests’’ that
accompany many constitutional policing practices when they occur in
public: ‘‘Arrests or street stops infringe privacy in this sense because they
stigmatize the individual, single him out, and deprive him of freedom.’’186
182. See id. at 605, 608, 613–15.
183. See, e.g.,Michigan v. Summers, 452U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (reasoning that detention of
a person in a private residence ‘‘would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity
associated with a compelled visit to the police station’’).
184. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
185. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. W. Va. State Police, 731 F. Supp. 2d 521, 537 (S.D. W.Va
2010); Bancroft v. City of Mount Vernon, 672 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Luster v.
Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2009). In fact, there appears to be substantial
overlap between the language courts employ in describing the harms of publicity and the
language they employ in describing the invasiveness of strip searches generally. See Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009) (describing the ‘‘indignity’’
of a ‘‘degrading’’ strip search of a student, who recounted the experience as ‘‘embarrassing,
frightening, and humiliating’’). Although strip searches do not take place in public, the
reason that courts treat strip searches as categorically distinct is precisely because of this
concern for the stigma and indignity of being ‘‘seen’’ by ‘‘others’’ in a particular way.
186.William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93MICH. L.
REV. 1016, 1021 (1995).
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More recently, numerous scholars have demonstrated the slew of ways that
the public stigma associated with subjection to basic policing tactics, such as
the classic Terry stop, reinforce harmful social models of race and gender.187
Similar arguments have been marshalled to support Fourth Amendment
challenges to the stigmatizing practices ranging from drug-dog sniffs188 to
‘‘perp walks.’’189
Much like a perp walk, or a mug shot,190 the traditional ankle monitor is
an archetypal display of criminality. It is sufficiently entwined into the
American cultural consciousness, being regularly referenced in popular
culture and satirized in social media, as to be easily recognized by most
members of the public.191 Because of the cultural meaning attached, an
ankle monitor’s presence is also expressive—its presence communicates
something about both the deviance and dangerousness of the person wear-
ing it.192 In contexts outside of the Fourth Amendment, the spectacle of
sex offender monitoring has found resonance with some courts.193 In
finding that monitoring was an unconstitutional punishment, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey recently opined on its stigmatizing effects:
187. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority
Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57 (2014); Frank Rudy Cooper, ‘‘Who’s the Man?’’:
Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671
(2009); Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income
Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 304–36 (2013).
188. Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops,
62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 723–24 (2015) (‘‘When police use drug-sniffing dogs during a non-
criminal traffic stop, they communicate the message that the motorist is not simply a non-
criminal traffic violator, but also a potential drug criminal. These messages can have
humiliating and stigmatizing effects on innocent civilians, especially racial minority motor-
ists more commonly subjected to drug-sniffs during pretextual traffic stops.’’).
189. Palma Paciocco, Pilloried in the Press: Rethinking the Constitutional Status of the
American Perp Walk, 16NEW CRIM. L. REV. 50, 101 (2013). (‘‘The perp walk does violence to
a person’s dignity and privacy. It is a highly public, highly ritualistic event that stigmatizes
and humiliates.’’).
190. See id. (discussing JONATHAN FINN, CAPTURING THE CRIMINAL IMAGE: FROM
MUG SHOT TO SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY viii (2009)).
191. Although the monitored offender has some ability to avoid the stigma of publicity,
those efforts may require substantial changes to one’s life, a cost that is too easily overlooked
or minimized in the legal analysis of intrusion. See supra note 167.
192. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 141.
193. Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Mass. 2009) (‘‘As ‘continuing,
intrusive, and humiliating’ as a yearly registration requirement might be, a requirement
permanently to attach a GPS device seems dramatically more intrusive and burdensome.’’).
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Even though [the statute’s] purpose is not to shame Riley, the ‘‘effects’’ of the
scheme will have that result. If Riley were to wear shorts in a mall or a bathing
suit on the beach, or change clothes in a public locker or dressing room, or
pass through an airport, the presence of the device would become apparent to
members of the public. The tracking device attached to Riley’s ankle identifies
Riley as a sex offender no less clearly than if he wore a scarlet letter.194
In sum, technological monitoring of sex offenders has the potential to work
a particular kind of dignitary and privacy harm, one that is increasingly
cognizable in constitutional analysis generally.195 Unlike the intrusions
discussed in prior sections, this harm emanates not from the quantity or
quality of private information collected in the government’s search, but
rather from the very spectacle of the search itself.
Fortunately, the stigmatizing potential of sex offender monitoring
regimes is almost entirely a function of the technology the government
chooses to employ. This means that states have the power to implement
monitoring regimes in ways that are more or less intrusive—and thus more
or less constitutionally reasonable—both currently and in response to
future technological advances. For example, the visibility of a monitoring
device is a function of its size, shape, location, and distinctive configura-
tion. A GPS-based monitoring device that approximates a wristwatch, such
as those popular with long-distances runners, may be less obvious, and thus
less a brand of criminality, than a traditional ankle monitor—even if an
offender cannot remove it. Similar benefits may be achieved by using of
devices that may be worn around parts of the body more frequently covered
with clothing, such as the bicep or sternum. Reducing or eliminating
visible light and audible alerts may help to minimize the attention a mon-
itoring device draws. Not to be overlooked, increasing the reliability of the
devices used may result in reducing the police presence at the subject’s
home, due either to the need for maintenance or to false alerts.196 Certainly
these, and other, advances are already possible.
194. Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 98 A.3d 544, 559 (N.J. 2014).
195. The constitutional guarantee of Due Process similarly restricts the government from
bringing an ordinary criminal defendant to trial in shackles or prison garb, as these trappings
unavoidably and impermissibly connote guilt and dangerousness to the jury. See Deck v.
Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 627 (2005); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504–05 (1976).
196. Device unreliability can also create spectacle outside of the home. For example,
some monitored individuals have described their devices losing signal in large buildings,
requiring them to abruptly depart in the middle of activities or transactions in order to
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We readily admit that the Fourth Amendment does not require the use
of the best-available or least intrusive technology. The touchstone, as
always, is reasonableness. At the same time, courts faithful to the spirit
of the Fourth Amendment should be particularly wary of governmental
choices that seem to be inviting spectacle. The history of the public pillory
is not so far behind us. Indeed, it was not so long ago that someone thought
it wise to invite the media into someone else’s private home. To ignore or
minimize this dimension of intrusion in the context of technological mon-
itoring, even for convicted sex offenders, would be to undermine the
privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment.
I V . ANT IC IPAT ING END -RUNS : IS GRADY
FACT -BOUND?
The foregoing analysis makes the case that the Fourth Amendment should
meaningfully inform how technology is deployed in monitoring sex offen-
ders. Before concluding, we also want to briefly anticipate and address two
potential legislative choices that might be viewed as ways around the con-
straints on monitoring imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Ironically,
these choices operate by dispensing with any characterization of techno-
logical monitoring as purely civil, a characterization that has frequently
insulated sex offender laws from challenge under other constitutional pro-
visions. These seemingly easy ‘‘solutions’’ will undoubtedly occur to some
legislators—perhaps those seeking to preserve the status quo in the face of
technological advances capable of reducing the invasion experienced by
released sex offenders, or perhaps those seeking to implement even more
invasive technologies for other, potentially punitive, purposes. Upon
inspection, neither ‘‘solution’’ seems likely to permit a complete end-run
of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness as it applies to
technological monitoring regimes. In fact, closer scrutiny suggests they may
be much less successful than one might initially imagine.
re-establish the lost connection. See Brief for the ACLU of Mich. and the Crim. Def. Atty’s
of Mich. as Amici Curiae, supra note 97, at *App’x. It goes without saying that the
possibility of such a revealing occurrence is likely to chill the offender’s willingness to
engage in these everyday social (and often essential) activities in the first place.
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A. Imposing Monitoring as a Punishment
The first potential end-run occurs when governments decide to impose
technological monitoring on sex offenders as part of the explicit punish-
ment for their crimes. A number of states currently have laws permitting
or requiring monitoring as a part of the sentence for at least some subset
of sex offenses. A quintessential example is Michigan, which statutorily
mandates lifetime electronic monitoring for anyone convicted of a first- or
second-degree sex offense involving a child under the age of 13.197 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly announced that prisoners have a drastically
diminished expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens.198 One
might therefore assume that imposing electronic monitoring as a kind of
‘‘technological incarceration’’ will permit a much greater level of intrusion by
virtue of the weakened Fourth Amendment interests at stake under these
circumstances. In addition, there may be an inclination to discount the
intrusion of technological monitoring by comparing it to the intrusion of
incarceration as an alternative punishment.199 In fact, Judge Posner made
a similar argument in upholding Wisconsin’s civil monitoring program in
Belleau.200
This argument turns out to be much weaker than it might appear,
however. There is nothing talismanic about labeling a search a ‘‘punish-
ment’’ that automatically diminishes the privacy interests of the person
being searched. The Supreme Court’s proclamations that prisoners have
a reduced privacy interest are the result of a practical determination about
the realities of custodial incarceration. For example, the Court famously
announced inHudson v. Palmer that ‘‘the Fourth Amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the
prison cell.’’201 Yet it is clear that this conclusion followed from the fact
that recognizing a right of privacy in a cell—perhaps the only place inmates
can reliably conceal contraband, including weapons—would render the
197. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520n(1) (2006).
198. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
199. See, e.g., Bagaric, Hunter, & Wolf, supra note 4, at 125 (explaining that monitored
offenders have increased privacy because, ‘‘unlike the inmates of many conventional prisons,
they will be free to shower, use the toilet, and participate in other daily activities un-
scrutinized by others’’).
200. Belleau, 811 F.3d at 932.
201. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
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already extraordinarily difficult undertaking of prison administration ‘‘lit-
erally impossible.’’202 In the same opinion, the Court reiterated its contin-
ued insistence ‘‘that prisoners be accorded those rights not fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives
of incarceration.’’203 In other words, stripping prisoners of certain Fourth
Amendment protections is done precisely and only because it is necessary
to effectuate reasonable incapacitation.204
Moreover, when the Fourth Amendment does apply to those in prison
custody, it applies in the ordinary way. A recent opinion from the same
Term in which the Court announced Jones demonstrates this principle.
Albert Florence, arrested on an erroneous bench warrant for failing to pay
a court fine, was subjected to two separate strip searches as part of the
intake process at two New Jersey correctional facilities.205 According to
Florence, the searches involved (among other things) his completely dis-
robing, opening his mouth and lifting his tongue for inspection, lifting his
genitals, and coughing in a squatting position.206 The Supreme Court was
sharply divided over whether such an extensive search was reasonable, given
that there was no reason to suspect that Florence would be concealing
contraband.207 (There was no debate that a search had occurred.) The
Fourth Amendment framework employed by the Court was the same
familiar reasonableness standard employed outside prison walls: ‘‘The need
for a particular search must be balanced against the resulting invasion of
personal rights.’’208 Although the Court ultimately held that the needs of
preventing contraband from entering the general jail population out-
weighed the indignity of the search, Justice Kennedy’s opinion hinted that
the outcome could easily have been different had either the government’s
interest been less substantial (as in the case of prisoners held in isolation) or
202. Id. at 527.
203. Id. at 523.
204. We acknowledge, of course, that the diminution of privacy experienced by pris-
oners may also incidentally serve retributive goals. However, we do not read the Court’s
jurisprudence to suggest that the reduction in Fourth Amendment protection is itself a part
of the punishment imposed, rather than merely incidental to a lawful punishment.
205. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 323 (2012).
206. Id. at 323–24.
207. The Court divided 5–4, and Justice Breyer wrote a strongly worded dissent
emphasizing the humiliation and degradation involved in body cavity searches. See id. at 342
(Breyer, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 327 (majority opinion).
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the invasiveness of the search been more significant (as in the case of
a search involving physical touching).209
Crucially, Albert Florence’s case illustrates that all Fourth Amendment
searches—even those of prisoners—must be tailored to the government’s
legitimate aims. It is here that the end-run meets its end. With one notable
exception, we can think of few arguments that meaningfully distinguish the
purposes of technological monitoring, when imposed as a punishment for
a crime, from those of the same monitoring when imposed as a form of civil
protection, at least with respect to the same individual.210 Under either
monitoring regime, the primary purpose of monitoring is to deter future
criminality by increasing the probability of detection. Any other purposes
can be achieved more effectively via other means (e.g., a scarlet letter).
Because increasing the probability of detection is accomplished through
the collection of information, the ‘‘search’’ that is monitoring should be
tailored to be only as intrusive as necessary to collect the pertinent infor-
mation in a manner that supports the goal of deterrence.
It is theoretically possible that the use of more intrusive technology—
a more physically taxing device, or a device that collects more or more
intimate information than needed to deter—would also have some small
general deterrent effect. We strain to imagine, however, a straight-faced
constitutional advocate arguing to a court that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit an otherwise unreasonable search because the govern-
ment receives such an attenuated benefit from the most egregious intru-
sions.211 The argument proves far too much and would rob the Fourth
Amendment of nearly any bite. As the aims of both civil and punitive
technological monitoring very nearly converge, the reasonableness
209. See id. at 338–39.
210. The exception is the intrusion of public stigma. In Part III.D, we concluded that the
goals of a civil sex offender monitoring regime are not furthered by a search that invites
public stigma. However, shaming punishments have seen a resurgence of interest in recent
years, notwithstanding their questionable efficacy and policy. See generally James Q.
Whitman,What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1998). It
is at least plausible that a legislature could choose to impose technological monitoring as
a punishment in a manner that invites stigmatization and social castigation. However, if
these were the goals, they could be accomplished much more effectively as a separate cat-
egory of punishment, one that sends clearer signals, is less costly to maintain, and so on.
211. On that logic, the Fourth Amendment would likewise have nothing to say about
imposing a daily strip search as a punishment for a non-contraband crime, such as tax
evasion.
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requirements of the Fourth Amendment should be quite similar regardless
of how the statute is labelled.
B. Requiring Consent to Monitoring as a Condition of Parole
or Probation
A second anticipated legislative end-run around the Fourth Amendment
occurs when governments require that offenders consent to monitoring as
a condition of their parole or probation. Currently, several states already
approach monitoring in this way. Tying technological monitoring to parole
or probation might be thought to weaken claims of intrusiveness in two
separate ways. First, it could undermine the weight of the offender’s privacy
interests in the evaluation of whether the search was unreasonable. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that parolees and probationers exist
along a spectrum of diminished privacy that includes prisoners at one
extreme and ordinary citizens at the other. The Supreme Court has
invoked this rationale twice this century, first to uphold the warrantless
search of a probationer in United States v. Knights,212 and subsequently to
uphold the warrantless search of a parolee in Samson v. California.213
Second, if technological monitoring is a condition of parole or probation,
the search effected by that monitoring is arguably consensual. Consensual
searches are a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s re-
quirements of a warrant and probable cause.214 Indeed, Judge Posner in
Belleau anticipated this tactic and described it as an ‘‘unassailable’’ legisla-
tive response that would have given the plaintiff in that case a hollow
victory on Fourth Amendment grounds.
We can dispense with the first part of the argument relatively quickly,
however, as the same logic that applies to prisoners applies with perhaps
greater force to probationers and parolees. Neither Knights nor Samson
held that a person’s penal status alone permits a level of intrusion com-
parable to the constant electronic surveillance experienced by monitored
sex offenders. Rather, as always, the intrusion into privacy must be jus-
tified by the goals to be served, including the reintegration of the offender
212. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
213. Samson, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
214. Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 509, 512 (2015).
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into society and the protection of the community. In fact, Knights held
only that a one-time, warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment
was reasonable when it was supported by individualized suspicion that
a probation violation had occurred.215 The Supreme Court left open the
question whether the search of a probationer could ever be reasonable
absent individualized suspicion.216
Samson, by contrast, did uphold the suspicionless search of a parolee
(who, by virtue of that status, had less of an expectation of privacy than
a probationer).217 Parole may therefore provide a firmer legal foothold for
suspicionless technological monitoring of sex offenders. However, the Sam-
son Court was explicit that the government did not have ‘‘a blanket grant of
discretion untethered by any procedural safeguards’’:218
The concern that California’s suspicionless search system gives officers
unbridled discretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms
that arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to
reintegrate into productive society, is belied by California’s prohibition on
‘‘arbitrary, capricious or harassing’’ searches. The dissent’s claim that par-
olees under California law are subject to capricious searches conducted at the
unchecked ‘‘whim’’ of law enforcement officers ignores this prohibition.219
At first blush, the Samson Court’s reliance on a state-level policy prohibit-
ing arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches seems to be cold comfort for
parolees. But consider the contrast being drawn here, and its implications
for the reasonableness of technological monitoring. If the dividing line
between constitutional and unconstitutional searches of parolees is
caprice—unchecked whims, unbridled discretion—what are we to make
of monitoring technologies that subject a person to constant surveillance,
that record and store the results of that surveillance for some indefinite
future use? As we previously discussed in connection with the mosaic
215. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
216. Id. at 120 n.6 (‘‘We do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished,
or completely eliminated, Knight’s reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by
a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The terms of the probation con-
dition permit such a search, but we need not address the constitutionality of a suspicionless
search because the search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion.’’).
217. Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
218. Id. at 856 (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
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theory of the Fourth Amendment, the aggregation of data from a constant
technologically enhanced search program is likely to be viewed differently
by a court than an examination of any single search. Samson thus suggests
that the Fourth Amendment may in fact continue to be a source of mean-
ingful pushback to the implementation of technological monitoring, even
with respect to parolees and their diminished privacy expectations.
The issue of consent, however, is murkier. To date, the Supreme Court
has explicitly avoided the question whether an individual can consent to
suspicionless searches as a condition of probation or parole.220 The notion
that a probationer or parolee consents to technological monitoring as a con-
dition of release may hold intuitive appeal. After all, ‘‘consent search’’ pro-
grams are a common facet of everyday life—at least for anyone who has
flown on an airplane recently.221 In contexts such as air travel, we see
consenting to governmental searches as a worthwhile price in exchange for
certain liberties. However, the legal issue is actually quite a bit more com-
plicated with respect to probationers and parolees (undoubtedly a reason
why the Supreme Court has so far punted). The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that consensual searches are evaluated under the same constitutional
standard as voluntary confessions—that is, they must be free from the taint
of duress or coercion, whether express or implied.222 Even if parolees or
probationers have the choice to opt for incarceration,223 there are substantial
arguments to be made that the conditions of such choice are coercive, and
thus the consent offered is not truly voluntary. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
long held that the government may never induce consent to an unreasonable
search by making it a condition of probation because ‘‘there is a limit on the
price the government may exact’’ for freedom.224 Ultimately, the voluntar-
iness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from the full panoply
220. See id. at 852 n.3; Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
221. See United States vs Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
222. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
223. Many do not. In some states, parole is imposed unilaterally and the offender has no
option of remaining incarcerated if he or she disagrees with the parole conditions. To speak
of ‘‘consent’’ to search in those circumstances would be to engage in the most unhelpful
kind of legal fiction.
224. United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc)). But, of course, this is an
unsettled question, and some courts have in fact found voluntary consent in similar cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Yeary, 740 F.3d 569, 583 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding
voluntary, uncoerced consent to warrantless searches as a condition of pre-trial release).
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of circumstances, including whether the suspect knows that he has a right to
refuse.225 Thus the effectiveness of this strategy as a potential end-run
around the Fourth Amendment is far from obvious.
CONCLUS ION
The Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness calls for balancing
two sets of weighty interests. There is no easy answer to the question when
a proper balance has been struck. A crucial first step is to identify the
relevant factors that comprise those interests so that they can be fairly
assessed. An important goal of this Essay has been to disaggregate the key
dimensions of intrusiveness of technological monitoring, particularly in the
case of convicted sex offenders who are facing monitoring for many years or
life. Notwithstanding our disaggregation, the Fourth Amendment reason-
ableness inquiry is always an assessment of the totality of the circumstances.
We can imagine different ways that this plays out in litigation. On the
one hand, courts may employ an arithmetical model of intrusion, finding
that a state’s chosen monitoring technology is reasonable whenever the
aggregate intrusion is below a particular threshold. On this model, courts
may tolerate a high level of intrusion along one or more dimensions,
provided that those intrusions are offset by sufficiently minor intrusions
along other dimensions. Alternatively, the realities of litigation may tend to
drive courts’ attention to the most egregious intrusions. As a result, courts
may naturally gravitate toward a low-variance model of reasonableness that
seeks to minimize outliers, even if it means a higher level of citizen intru-
sion in the aggregate. Either way, we believe that policymakers seeking to
design and enforce a monitoring regime that respects the law and the spirit
of the Fourth Amendment will find guidance in this Essay. At the same
time, by identifying the Fourth Amendment pressure points of monitoring,
we hope that we have provided advocates and reformers with at least some
grist for the mill when they run headlong into monitoring regimes that are
unnecessarily or arbitrarily burdensome. Technological monitoring can be
tailored to fit the characteristics and circumstances of individual convicted
sex offenders and, in so doing, reduce the intrusiveness of the search, just as
the Fourth Amendment entreats the government to do.
225. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248–49.
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